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1. Where a corporation had stock at its disposal, and gave an agent power to sell
it in market and issue certificates therefor, any person purchasing it of the agent
in good faith and paying value, would acquire a perfect title to it, although the
agent by a secret fraud intended the transaction for his own benefit, and used the
funds he received.
2. But no right would in such case be acquired by one not dealing with the agent
in good faith, or paying nothing for the stock; and the certificate given such person would be void.
:%Schuyler, the transfer agent of the New Haven Railroad Company, had no power •
to issue certificates for stock, except upon a transfer on the Company's books by
a previous owner, and a surrender of that owner's certificate. He was merely an
agent for making transfers, and had no general power to issue certificates.
4. Neither the board of directors, nor the whole body of the corporation, had power
to create stock beyond the number of shares limited by the charter; and if the
purchaser had paid full value to the transfer agent for certificates of stock issued
beyond the number limited by the charter, the certificates would be void.
5. The plaintiffs in this action, holding certificates by transfer from one to whom
they were fraudulently issued, and which represented no stock, acquire no rights
as stockholders.
1. The certificates were void in the hands of the first holder, because frandulently issued.
2. They were void in his hands, because issued without authority, there having
been no surrender of a previous certificate and transfer, on the books, of actual
stock.
They were void, because the stock they professed to represent had no real
existence, and under the charter of the Company, could not have any.
We are obliged to the Reporter of the Court of Appeals for this important
mtd interesting case. We regre. that our space does not permit us to present the
masterly argument of the appellants' counsel.-Nds. Am. L. Reg,.
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4. They were void, under all possible circumstances, so that no person can
claim under them rights as a stockholder, or damages for the refusal to admit
him to such rights.
6 . The law will not require a corporation to violate its charter by creating an excess
of stock to supply a spurious certificate; it will not punish it in damages for refusing to be guilty of such a violation.
7. By a purchase of a certificate of stock in a corporation with a power to transfer it,
the purchaser, before transfer, acquires an equitable titleto thevendor's stock; and
if the vendor's title is open to no impeachment, a right to call upon the corporation
to permit him to clothe himself with the legal title, by a transfer upon the books
and a certificate; but he acquires no new or superior rights against the corporation.
8. Certificates of stock in a corporation are not negotiable instruments in the sense
of the commercial law, so that by their endorsement and delivery to a purchaser
in good faith, a title to the stock they profess to represent may be acquired, if it
be spurious or void in the hands of the vendor.
9. The holder of a false or fraudulent certificate of stock cannot, by endorsing and
transferring it to another, create a title to the stock it professes to represent, hostile to the corporation.
10. Certificates of stock in a corporation are not in any sense securities for money,
but simply the muniments and evidence of the holder's title to his interest in the
corporate property.
11. Nor are they in the nature of letters of credit, on the faith of which every one
may act. Neither by their terms, nor by implication, do they request, invite, or
guaranty credit, any more than the possession of property of any description, or
choses in action.
12. An agent may clothe his act with all the indicia of authority, and yet the act
may not be within the real or apparent power. The principal is responsible for
the apparentpower; not for the appearance of the act, if unauthorized.
13. The employment of an agent in situations of trust, is not such a recommendation by his principal as to render him liable to others whom the agent has deceived to their injury. except where the fraud is committed in doing the principal's business.
14. The doctrine of estoppel is not applicable in this case. The false certificate contains no representation or admission which any third party may accept a"
addressed to himself, and intended to influence his conduct.

This action was brought by the plaintiffs, in the Superior Court
of the City of New York, to recover from the defendants eight
thousand five hundred dollars, as the par value of eighty-five shares
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,)f capital stock of the New York and New Haven railroad company.
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint, that on the 13th day of
May, 18541, they loaned to Alexander Kyle $12,000 upon his promissory note, payable on demand, and accompanied by certificates
for one hundred and ten shares of Harlem stock, and eighty-five
shares of stock of the New York and New Haven railroad company,
with a power to sell them as a collateral security for the loan ; that
they supposed the certificate to be, and received it as a genuine and
valid certificate, and that its*signature was in the handwriting of
Robert Schuyler, the president and transfer agent of.the company,
and that it conformed in every respect to the genuine certificates
of the company's stock; that Kyle had failed to pay the loan, and
the plaintiffs had presented the certificate and power to transfer at
the transfer office of the company, and demanded leave to transfer
the shares, but the company refused to permit the transfer, and
alleged that the certificate was spurious. The defence interposed
was, that the certificate was falsely and fraudulently issued by
Schuyler, and that it represented no genuine stock, and that prior
to and at the time it was issued, the whole number of shares of
stock which were permitted -by the charter, had been actually subscribed for, paid in full, and certificates issued therefor, which were
held by bona-fide stockholders.
The cause was tried before Mr.

JUsTIcE

BOSWORTH, who, on the

22d of February, 1855, found, among other things:
"That Schuyler made and signed this certificate for eighty-five
shares of the defendants' stock, and delivered it to Kyle to borrow
money upon it for him the said Schuyler; that it did not represent
any of the genuine stock of the defendants, being no part of the
capital authorized by law. I also find that it was not issued for
any lawful purpose whatever, but was a fraud on the part of Schuyler to raise money for his own private purposes." And upon the
facts the conclusion of law, that the " defendants were liable to the
plaintiffs for the market value of the stock, with interest, amounting
to $8,072 68," for which sum judgment was given.
The judgment was appealed from by the defendants to the genral term of the court, and there affirmed. June 27, 1855.
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An Appeal was therefore brought to the Court of Appeals, and
in the March Term, 1856, heard before that court. Present-Hon. HIRAM DNIo, Chief Judge; Hon. ALEXANDER S. JOHNOMSTOCK, Hon. WILLIAM B. WRIGHT,
SON, Hon. GEORGE F.
Hon. WILLIA- MITCHELL, Hon. FIEDERICK V. HUBBARD, 7udges,
The cause was argued by
Messrs. William Curtis Noyes and George JJfood, with whom
was associated Mr. Nicholas Hill, jun., for the defendants; and by
Messrs. B. . Vran WJinklc and Daniel Lord, for the plaintiffs.
It was held under advisement until the 17th June, 1856, when
the following unanimous opinion of the court was delivered by
CoMSToIK2, J.-This is an action for damages, founded on a certi-

ficate for eighty-five shares of stock in the defendants' corporation,
issued to Alexander Kyle, upon the security of which the plaintiffs
loaned to that person a sum of money; and the first inquiry naturally is, what was the force and effect of the certificate in his hand ?
The mode of presenting this inquiry most favorable to the plaintiffs,
is to consider it as free from the difficulty that there was no power
in the corporation, its board of directors, or any of its agents, to
create the shares of stock in question. Assuming that the corporation had stock at its own disposal, and that Robert Schuyler, as
agent, had full power to sell it in market, and issue the proper
certificates therefor, it is clear that any person dealing with him in
good faith, and paying value, would become entitled to all the rights
and privileges of a stockholder,. although the agent, by a secret
fraud, intended the transaction to be for his own benefit, and used
the funds which he received for his own private purposes. In such
a case, the acts of the agent being such as the corporation was competent to perform, and strictly within the powers delegated to him,
upon principles entirely familiar, the law would not permit third
persons to suffer by a secret abuse of the trust.
But it is equally clear that no rights would be acquired by a
party not dealing with the agent in good faith, and receiving a
certificate of stock without paying any value therefor. To say that
the original holder of such a certificate could not be admitted to a
participation with the genuine and bona-fide stockholders in the
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property, franchises, and revenues of the corporation, is a proposition so plain that it needs only to be stated. Such was the situation of Alexander Kyle, the original holder of the certificate now
in question. To what extent he was implicated in the frauds of
Schuyler ii not material. The certificate is admitted to have been
issued fravlulently, and he paid nothing for it. On this ground it
was, in his hands, spurious and void; and this is a conclusion which
is reached without calling in question the power of the corporation
to create the stock, or of Schuyler, as agent, to issue the proper
evidence thereof to a purchaser in good faith.
The certificate in the hands of Kyle was also void, for the reasons
which will now be mentioned: 1. Schuyler, as the agent of the
company, had no power to issue a certificate for shares of stock,
except upon the conditions precedent of a transfer on the books by
some previous owner, and the surrender of that owner's certificate.
He was the transfer agent merely, and his powers were expressly
limited to that department of the business of the corporation. "He
had no general certifying power, nor any power at all to certify,
except as incidentalto a transfer of stock by its owner to some one
else; and as an incidental power it could only be exercised upon
the conditions named. 2. Neither the board of directors by whom
Schuyler was appointed agent, nor the whole body of the corporation, had power to create the stock which the certificate issued to
Kyle professed to represent ; and if the stock itself could not be
brought into existence by the whole power of the corporation, the
the certificate issued as the evidence of its existence, and the right
of the holder thereto, was necessarily void. Upon the premises
last stated the conclusioii would bo the same, even if Kyle had paid
to the transfer agent the full value of the stock. He could purchase stock of any person who owned it, but he could not, under any
conditions, obtain it from the corporation or its agents, because there
was none to be had, and none could be created.
Thus far I do not understand that my conclusions differ essentially
from the views of counsel who have argued the cause for the plaintiffs; and if I was not mistaken in regard to the general scope of
this argument, they conceded the further result, that the plaintiffs,
46
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holding the certificate by transfer from Kyle, have no rights as
stockolders, merely for the particuler reason that the stock cannot
exist under the charter ; the essential ground of the action in the
view of the counsel, being the injury sustained by dealing upon the
faith of the false representation of stock which the certificate contains. The opinions, however of the judges in the court below, are
before us for examination, as well as those of eminent lawyers who
have not appeared upon the argument; and I think it is proper to
refer to these opinions for the purpose of bringing into view all the
theories upon which it has been supposed the plaintiffs' rights
depend.
Mr. Justice Hoffman, in the opinion pronounced by him, holds
that the certificate was not void as transcending the powers of the
corporation in the creation of stock and issuing certificates therefor,
or those delegated to Schuyler as the transfer agent. He, therefore, considers the obligation to be one which the defendants can
perform, and ought to perform, according to its terms. He admits
that the effect of an over-issue is to increase the number of shares,
but not the actual capital; and according to his view, the spurious
certificates are to be made good by a reduction in the actual value
of those that are now genuine. He holds, therefore, that the
defendants were bound to admit the plaintiffs as stockholders, and
to register their shares on the books accordingly; and that this suit
depends purely and simply on the non-performance of that duty,
after being requested to perform it. "Without a demand," he says,
"and refusal to transfer, there would be no ground of action whatever."
Directly opposed to these views are thbse of Chief Justice Oakley. He holds the certificate utterly void, because it transcended
the powers of the transfer agent, whose commission, he thinks, was
special, and not general; and if the action depended on the validity
of the certificate, he says, the following questions would have to be
answered :-1. Whether the plaintiffs, as bonafide holders, could
acquire any rights under it superior to those of Kyle, in whose
hands it was void? And 2. Whether the plaintiffs can be considered as bonafide holders ?
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As to the last point, he inclines to think that the plaintiffs were
bound to see that Schuyler, as agent, did not exceed his special
powers, and, therefore, if they chose to deal in the stock without
inquiring as to that fact, they took the certificates from Kyle at their
peril. But the learned Chief Justice, nevertheless, holds the defendants liable, on the ground that the certificate was a false representation that Kyle held stock when in truth he did not. He thinks
that Schuyler, the agent, had an implied authority from the company, to make such a representation-an authority resulting from
his constant habit of issuing certificates in the same form in the
course of the regular business of the corporation. If, as he assumes,
the certificate was void, tested simply by the authority given to the
agent, and if, as he also assumes, the plaintiffs were bound to take
notice of the want of authority,-with deference, it appears to me,
that they are affected by the same considerations when they change
the grounds of complaint to misrepresentation and fraud. Can an
agent's authority to misrepresent in the course of a dealing be
inferred, when it is admitted he has no authority to enter into the
dealing at all?
Justices Bosworth and Slosson, if I do not misunderstand them,
both admit that there was no power in the corporation to create the
shares which the certificate professes to represent, and that the
instrument, considered as a real representative of stock, was void
for that reason; thus discarding the only ground upon which, in the
opinion of their brethren, the action can be maintained. They,
nevertheless, held that the suit is not founded upon the notion of
misrepresentation and fraud, thus as distinctly rejecting the theory
of the other. They appear to me to have found a middle ground
of liability, which is perhaps fairly expressed in the following language of Justice Bosworth :-" The certificate," he says, "so far as
any inferences can be drawn from its terms or appearance, purports
to be, and is, as much the act of the defendants, as any certificate
that has been issued by the company representing genuine stock.
The plaintiffs took it, believing it to be what it purports to be; and
their action is based on the theory that, as between them and the
defendants, it is in judgment of law the act of the defendants: and
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that the defendants are estopped from asserting the contrary, so far
as the question of their liability for refusing to reimburse to the
plaintiff the amount of their loan to the extent of the value of the
stock is concerned." And again he says,-" The action is based
on the assumption, so far as the right to be compensated in damages
is concerned, that the company has given an assurance that Kyle
owned the stock which the certificate represents stood to his credit
on its books." The reasoning by which these results are reached,
is in substance, that the act of Schuyler in issuing the certificate,
was wiithin the apparent scope of his powers, and therefore, although
the contract was void because it transcended all the powers of the
corporation, and it was impossible to be performed for the same
reason, the defendant must, nevertheless, make it good in damages
upon an assurance that it was valid, the assurance being a part of
the contract itself. I confess my own impression to be, that this
reasoning is too refined. Admitting that the agent acted within
the scope of the power delegated to him by the board of directors,
I do not clearly see how certificates of stock which they themselves
had no authority to issue, void in their origin and under all circumstances, can be made the basis of a liability ruinous to the genuine
stockholders, by turning the spurious instruments into a promise
or understandingthat the stock in fact existed.
The extreme difficulty which has been encountered in endeavoring to find a principle on which to rest the action, may be further
illustrated by reference to the professional opinions which have been
submitted to our examination. In one of them-certainly entitled
to the very highest respect, the reasoning of which, I think must
have been in substance, approved by Mr. Justice Hoffman-it is
claimed that all the over-issued certificates are valid, so far as the
question of corporate power is concerned; that the multiplication
of shares did not increase the capital stock, but merely reduced the
value of the shares; that the acts of Schuyler in issuing such certificates, were done within the scope of his authority as agent; and as
a conclusion from these premises, that all the holders in good faith
who had not already received new certificates in their own names,
were entitled to receive them, and so to be admitted to all the rights
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and privileges of stockholders. In another of these opinions, distinguished by great acuteness and force of reasoning, the clear and
emphatic concession is made, that the defendants have no corporate
right to create a valid title to a single share of stock beyond the
prescribed number; that the corporation, being prohibited from issuing more than thirty thousand shares, was, by necessary consequence,
forbidden to recognize as a part of its stock, any share known to
have been issued contrary to that prohibition, and consequently,
that the directors might refuse to recognize all shares which could
be clearly traced to an origin in the over-issue. In respect to all
such shares, it is claimed however, that compensation in damages
must be made by the corporation to. the innocent holders who, by
dealing in them, have suffered pecuniary loss. The issue of false
certificates, it is insisted, was a failure of corporateduty, an act of
negligence by the corporation, for which it is liable to the party
injured. The company, it is also said, is bound by an estoppel in
favor of the innocent shareholder, and must either recognize him as
a stockholder, or respond in damages as a wrong-doer for withholding his apparent right.
If those who assert that this action can be maintained had been
able to agree upon a reason for that opinion, there would be fewer
propositions to discuss than I shall feel obliged to examine.
I have already stated in general terms, my own conclusion to be
on the side of the invalidity of the so-called spurious shares, upon
the ground of a want of corporate power to create them; and I will
now give some further expression to my views on that question.
By the charter of this railroad company, its capital stock was limited to $3,000,000, to be divided into shares of $100 each. It is
admitted that the whole capital was subscribed and paid in, and
that certificates of stock were issued, representing the 30,000 shares
actually subscribed and paid for. Now, if it is plain, as all concede, that the capital could not be increased beyond the $3,000,000,
it seems to me equally plain that no more than 30,000 shares could
be created. Both are unalterably fixed by the charter; the capital,
by expressing the aggregate amount, and the number of shares by
expressing the amount of each. The whole capital is divided into

MECHANICS BANK vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

shares of $100 each, and the mathematical result is 30,000 in all.
Viewing the question, therefore, as one of abstract power, nothing
appears to be wanting to a complete demonstration that additional
shares could not be created. There is under the charter no more
capacity to increase the nominal capital by multiplying the shares
to an indefinite extent, than to increase the real capital by an actual
subscription, indefinitely beyond the specified limit.
But it is important to observe that the question has other relations than those which belong to it as one of simply capacity and
power. The 30,000 shares of original stock subscribed and paid
for by the persons to whom the genuine certificates were issued,
belonged to them in their individual right, and were as much their
separate and individual property as any other possession which they
could acquire. The entire capital was represented in the property
and franchises of the corporation, and the owner of each share was
entitled to a fixed and unalterable proportion of that capital. And
from this it follows that any attempts to create a greater number of
shares by the issue of additional certificates, is not only a violation
of the organic law of the corporation, but a direct invasion of the
contract between it and each holder of its original stock. Now)
while it cannot be denied that the value of every share may be
reduced by misfortune or accident in the management of the business
of the corporation, or by the neglect and misconduct of its agents
acting within their acknowledged powers, it is equally plain that
this result cannot be affected by a change in the fixed proportion
which each share bears to the aggregate number. It has been
said, that the limitation of the capital and the number of shares
was imposed from considerations of public policy alone. This is
not so. Those who asked for the charter, and proposed to invest
their private capital in the enterprise which it contemplated, required such a limitation for their own protection; and every individual who subscribed and paid for shares of stock, must be deemed
to have done so relying upon the charter for the safety of his investment.
The conclusion to which I am brought upon the question, is not
impeached by the consideration (if such is the fact) that there are
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shares and certificates of stock beyond the original limit, which
cannot be traced to an over-issue by the fraudulent agent of the
Comp'iny. I know not how the facts may be in this respect, nor
is it material to the argument. The corporation may be compelled
to respond to the holders of certificates amounting in the aggregate
to more than its capital, because it cannot distinguish those which
are spurious and those which are genuine. Thus the number of
shares to be recognized =ay be practically increased, not for
the reason that all over-issues are not void, but because, in a given
instance, the corporation cannot show that the shares claimed are of
that character. No question of this kind arises in the case before us.
I have also stated in general terms, as one of my conclusions that
the certificate issued to Kyle was void in his hands, upon the more
special ground that the agent could not certify, except upon conditions which did not exist in respect to that transaction. I now
observe further, that a third person dealing with Kyle, and taking
from him a transfer of the certificate, doubtless had reason to suppose that it had been duly issued. Whether a dealing with him
under that belief created new rights against the corporation I shall
presently examine. But Kyle himself dealt directly with the agent
of the Company, and he knew the conditions had not arisen on
which the power to certify depended. He knew this, because he
surrendered no previous certificate, and had no transfer on the
books or otherwise from any actual shareholder. Now, I do not
understand it to be claimed, on the part of the plaintiffs, that the
acts of the agent in issuing the spurious certificates were within any
actual power which the corporation ever attempted to confer upon
him, nor that all persons proposing to deal in the stock were not
chargeable with a knowledge of the extent and limit of his authority.
He was known to be a transfer agent merely, of existing and genuine
shares, and in that character his name was signed to the certificate
in question and all others. What is claimed I understand to be
precisely this: That the false certificates being regular on their
face, and the same in form as those which are genuine, presented
to third parties dealing in them all the appearances of having been
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duly issued, although, in fact, the agent had no authority to issue
them, and although the exact extent of his authority was known.
But these appearances were known to be false by those who dealt
directly with the agent ; and with that knowledge it is not pretended
that they can assert any claim against the corporation. Such was
the situation of Kyle.
It is as well in this connection as any other, to notice a special
feature of the transaction, which I think imparts neither strength
nor weakness to the plaintiffs' case. The facts, as they appear in
the finding of the judge, are, that Kyle received the certificate not
for his own but the agent's use, and having negotiated with the
plaintiffs a loan by pledging it as security, paid the proceeds of the
transaction over to the agent. But these facts were not known to
the plaintiffs. They dealt with Kyle as the owner. Upon that
theory they have a right now to rely, and I understand them to do
so. It is the best the case will admit of. If they choose to take
the facts as they actually are, and to regard Kyle as a negotiator
merely between them and the fraudulent agent of the corporation,
they would then stand in the position of an immediate dealer with
the agent, receiving from him a certificate of stock issued without
authority; and this position, as I have shown, would be fatal to
their claim. They justly prefer to be regarded, and I do regard
them, as third parties, dealing with Kyle as the apparent owner of
stock.
In order to keep in view the exact conditions of the general
question, I think it proper to state the conclusions which I consider
thus far established. They are as follows: 1. The certificate was
void in the hands of Kyle, the first holder, because it was fraudulently issued, and he paid nothing for it. 2. It was also void in
his hands, because issued by an agent without authority, there being
no surrender of a previous certificate, and no transfer to him on the
books of actual stock; and this want of authority was known to him.
3. It was void, because the stock it professed to represent had no
existence, and could not exist under the charter of the Company,
all the powers of the corporation in the creation and issue of stock
being exhausted. In respect to the conclusion last mentioned, it
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must be, and I think is conceded, that as a further result the certificate is void under all possible circumstances, so that no person,
in whatever situation, can claim under it the rights of a stockholder,
or damages on the ground of a refusal to admit him to such rights.
As the law will not require the defendants to violate their charter by creating an excess of stock to supply this spurious certificate,
so it will not punish them in damages for refusing simply to be.
guilty of such violation. I consider this result so necessary and so
evident, as not to require further discussion.
I will proceed, however, to a more particular examination of the
plaintiffs' rights as the transferrees of Kyle; and, giving them the
most favorable view of the case, will consider the certificate as void
in his hands only on the ground that it was issued fraudulently,
without consideration, and without any authority contained in the
terms of Schuyler's appointment as transfer agent. In this view
the defendants' corporation is regarded as competent to recognize
the certificate; and if they are bound to do so, they must respond
in damages upon their refusal. The question, therefore, will be,Are they so bound ? or, to state it in another form,-are the plaintiffs in a situation to assert any rights against the Company which
Kyle, their assignor, did not possess?
By the charter of this corporation, the shares of its capital stock
were made transferable in such manner and in such places as the
by-laws should direct; and the by-laws declared that all transfers
.should be made in the transfer-book, kept at the proper
office, and
where a certificate of the stock had been issued, that the same should
be surrendered prior to the transfer being made. The certificate
now in question, as all others, declared on its face the same conditions. This certificate has, in fact, never been surrendered, and no
such transfer ever has been made. The plaintiffs on making their
loan to Kyle, took from him an assignment and power of attorney
in blank, but paid no regard to the fundamental conditions on which
alone a legal title to the stock could be transfered. Of these 'conditions, of course they had notice.
I am aware it is common to deal in this manner in the stock of
the.corporate companies, and I do not say that any rule of law or
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of public policy is violated by it. The dealer undoubtedly acquires
an equitable right to the stock of his vendor, and if the vendor's
title is open to no impeachment, he has a right to call upon the
corporation to clothe him also with the legal title by permitting a
transfer to himself on its books, and to demand a new certificate in
his own name. But the question here is, not whether the purchaser is clothed in equity with all the rights of the seller, but whether
by a transfer not made according to the laws of the corporation
itself-in short, whether his title is good when that of his vendor is
good for nothing.
So, too, it is common to deal in this manner with respect to obligations of every description. If extreme caution is exercised, the
purchaser will inquire of the maker of the obligation, and procure
his admission of its validity and his assent to the transfer; and
having done so, an estoppel will arise in his favor, not because he
has invested his money in the purchase, but because he purchased
after procuring such admission or consent and upon the faith thereof. Where there is no estoppel of this sort to rely upon, then the
question whether the transferree of an obligation, apparently sound
and from the apparent owner, any better right to enforce it than
his assignor had, depends on the nature of the obligation itself.
The general and familiar rule is, that he does not. If the instrument has negotiable qualities, then he may. In the case of negotiable instruments, the legal title passes by mere endorsement or
delivery. When they are not negotiable, an equitable title is all
that can be acquired; and this suggests the further observation,
that as between equities merely, the prior one, as a general rule,
prevails. The prior equity, as well as the law, is in favor of the
party who made the obligation, if for any good and valid reason he
ought not to be bound by it. The principle is so familiar that authorities need not be cited.
It seems to me, therefore, that we are brought directly to the
question whether certificates of stock in the defendants' corporation
are to be regarded as negotiable instruments, in the sense of the
commercial law, so that by their endorsement and delivery to a purchaser in good faith, a title to the stock they profess to represent
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may be acquired, although in the hand of the vendor they are spurious and void, and although the company itself has never recognized the transfer. This question, I think, must be answered in
the negative. They contain, in the first place, no words of negotiability. They declare simply that the person named is entitled to
certain shares of stock. They do not, like negotiable instruments,
run to the bearer, or to the order of the party to whom they are
given. They commence, it is true, with the words, "1be it known,"
but such words have no tendency to show that they possess the
quality claimed for them. A phraseology quite similar may be
found on bonds and other instruments which no one ever thought to
be negotiable.
But aside from the absence of any language of these certificates,
which can impart to them a negotiable character, both the laws of
the corporation and the certificates themselves contain special restrictions, which seem to me to put this question at rest. I do not
suppose that a corporation, without something very extraordinary
in its charter, can place such restraints upon the sale of its stock
that the individual holder may not transfer as good a title in equity
as he himself possesses, by any mode of assurance good upon general
principles of law. But if a natural person has an undoubted right so to
express the terms of his obligation that it shall not be negotiable in
the commercial sense, or iii any sense which can give to the purchaser a title superior to that of his vendor, I see no reason to doubt
that corporations possess the same right. Have the defendants so
expressed themselves in these certificates of stock ? I think they
have. They have distinctly declared, both in their by-laws and on
the face of the certificates, that shares can be transferred only on
the books, and on the surrender of the evidence of the previous
owner's title. If an illustration were wanting of the value of such
a restriction, it is furnished in the present case. But whatever its
value, the restraint is lawful in itself, and one which the corporation had an undoubted right to impose. I do not say that it prevents the owner of stock from selling his shares by an outside transfer, so that his vendee will acquire in equity his own rights; but to
say that the holder of a false and fraudulent certificate, by endors-
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ing and delivering it to another person, can create a title hostile to
the corporation itself, would be to deny the restriction any meaning or effect whatever.
I have examined attentively the authorities cited upon the question, but do not find that the doctrine contended for has in them
the least support; in the case of Cortright vs. The Commercial
Bank of Buffalo, 20 Wend. 91 ; S. C. in error, 22 Wend. 347, it
was held that an action of assumpsit will lie against the corporation
in favor of the assignee of a stock certificate, for refusing to permit a transfer on the books. This and the class of cases to which
it belongs prove, that a transfer not made according to the charter
or by-laws of a corporation confers upon the transferree, in an equitable sense, the title of the previous.owner that being thus clothed
with the equitable title, it is the duty of the corporation to permit
him to take a legal transfer on the books; and that the law will imply an assumpsit for the performance of that duty. For a breach
of this duty, actions of assumpsit and case have been indifferently
maintained. In principle, the remedy should have been a special
action on the case. Such was the opinion of Chief Justice Nelson
in the case referred to ; but he adds, "It being once settled (that
assumpsit will lie), there is no occasion for disturbing it." It is
only material to observe that the assumpsit is not in the certificate itself, and so passing by endorsement and delivery to the transferree, but is implied after the transferfrom the duty of the corporation to clothe the equitable owner with the legal title. Such cases,
so far from tending to show that a dealer in certificates acquires
rights better than those of the person with whom he deals, seem to
me to justify quite an opposite conclusion. They necessarily assume that the change of title is incomplete until the proper transfer
is made on the books.
In the case of Tatman vs. Loback, 1 Duer, 354, no question arose
involving the rights of the corporation. The decision is directly
opposed to those of Chancellor Walworth in Stebbins vs. _Phnix
Tire Ins. Co. 3 Paige, 350, and my own impression is that it cannot
be sustained. I find in it nothing which can affect the question I am
considering. The case was disposed of upon principles which were
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not asserted as having any peculiar application to dealing in stocks
or negotiable securities. The case of Stoney vs. The American
Life insurance and Trust Company, II Paige, 635, only held that
the negotialle security of a corporation, appearing on its face to
have been duly issued, was valid in the hands of a bonafide holder,
although in fact issued contrary to law. The case of -Delafieldvs.
The State of illinois, 2 Hill, 159, related to State bonds, payable to
bearer and strictly negotiable. Such securities are sometimes
called stocks, but a confusion of terms should not involve principles
in obscurity.
In the case of F isher vs. Te Morris Canal and Banking company, 3 Am. Law Reg. 423, the question was, whether the bonds
of a railroad corporation, payable to bearer, issued for the purpose of raising money, with interest coupons attached, also payable to bearer, were negotiable in such sense that a purchaser
for value took them free from any equities between the company
The decision was in favor of the purchaser,
and the seller.
and I fully concur in the doctrine. The distinction between
such a security and a stock certificate, which, by its very terms, is
not negotiable, and which is not a security for money at all, it
seems to me is too plain to escape observation.
These are the only authorities cited in favor of the doctrine contended for. It is quite evident that they have no tendency in that
direction. I will now mention some which are decisively the other
way. In the case of the Union Bank of Georgetown vs. Laird,
2 Wheaton, 390, the stock was transferable only on the books of the
corporation. The precise propositions decided were, that no legal
title to shares could be acquired except by a transfer made according
to the requirement, and that the equitable title of the transferree
was subject to all the rights of the corporation against his assignor.
The same doctrine was held by Chancellor Walworth, in Stebbins
vs. Phcenix ire Insurance Company, 3 Paige, 350.
In the State of Connecticut there have been a series of cases
goiwg still further. The registry on the books, when required by
the charter or by-laws of a corporation, is deemed the originating
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act in the change of title to stock, and a transfer not so made is regarded as ineffectual for any purpose, 2 Conn. 528; 3 ib. 544; 5
ib. 246; 6 ib. 552. So rigorous a d6ctrine has not been followed
elsewhere; and I think the established rule now is, that a transfer
of stock not made in the manner prescribed, is nevertheless valid so
as to pass in equity all the rights of the seller, but no greater. See
further, Angell and Ames on Corporations, 352, 353, 3d ed., where
the rule is stated and the cases cited.
Looking at the question upon principle, I am not aware of anything in the nature or uses of this kind of property, which requires
an application of the rules which belong to negotiable securities.
Stocks are not like bank bills, the immediate representative of
money, and intended for circulation. The distinction between a
bank bill and a share of bank stock, is not difficult to appreciate.
Nor are they like notes or bills of exchange less adapted to circulation, but invented to supply the exigencies of commerce, and governed by the peculiar code of the commercial law. They are not
like exchequer bills and government securities, which are made
negotiable either for circulation or to find a market. Nor are they
like corporation bonds, which are issued in negotiable form for
sale, and as a means for raising money for corporate uses. The
distinction between all these and corporate stocks, is marked and
striking. They are all in some form the representative of money,
and may be satisfied by payment in money at a time specified.
Certificates of stock are not securities for money in any sense, much
less are they negotiable securities. They are simply muniments
and evidence of the holder's title to a given share in the property
and franchises of the corporation of which he is a member. The
primary use and design, I must be allowed to say, of this species of
property is to afford a steady investment for capital, rather than to
feed the spirit of speculation. I am aware that people will speculate in stocks, as they sometimes do in lands, and there is no law
which absolutely forbids it; but such I am persuaded, is not the use
for which we should hold them chiefly intended.
The question is capable of some further elucidation by attending
to the rules which have been settled in regard to the transferability
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of other instruments and the effect of transfer.

A certificate of

stock is in some respects like a bill of lading or a warehouse or
wharfinger's receipt. Each is the representation of property existing under certain conditions, and the documentary evidence of title
thereto. They are all alike transferable by endorsement and delivery, and the title to the property thus represented passes by such
transfer. So far they resemble each other, but there are distinctions to be noted. Bills of lading and wharfinger's receipts are
commercial instruments, and their transferability, or as it is sometimes termed, their "quasi negotiability," depends on the custom
of merchants and the conveniences of trade. Certificates of stock
are not com'mercial instruments; and the title to the property they
represent passes in equity only by endorsement and delivery, where
by any law or rule of the corporation the transfer is required to be
made on the books. With these resemblances and these distinctions,
if a bill of lading is not negotiable in the sense which must be contended for in the present case, there is much greater difficulty in
affirming that such a quality belongs to a stock certificate.
In the great case of Lichbarrow vs. Mason, 2 Term Rep. 63;
5 id. 367, it was held that the consignor of goods had lost his right
of stoppage in transitu, when the consignee, holding the bill of
lading endorsed in blank by the consignor, delivered it to a third
person who received it in good faith and made advances upon it.
This has been the settled rule ever since. But in such cases, it is
to be observed, the legal title to the goods has vested by the sale
and consignment to the consignee, subject only to the peculiar and
anomalous right of arresting their delivery in the event of insolvency.
If, therefore, before this right is exercised, the consignee transfers
the bill of lading to another person, who takes it in good faith and
for value, the latter acquires the title which his vendor had at the
time of the transfer, and which the consignor cannot afterwards take
from him by stopping the goods before they have reached their destination. In this doctrine, which was settled after a very remarkable contest in the courts of England, is contained all the negotiable
quality that belongs to a bill of lading, and it requires but little discrimination to see that this is not negotiability in any just sense of
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that term. On the other hand, it has been held by the Supreme
Court and the late Court of Errors of this State---Saltus vs. .Everett, 15 Wend. 475 ; 20 id. 257 -that a bill of lading covering
goods shipped, but made without the owner's authority, cannot
affect the owner's title, into whatsoever hands the instrument may
come. So it has been lately held in the English Queen's Bench,
Gaurney vs. Behrend, 3 Ellis & Bi. 622, that if a bill of lading is
misappropriated, as if it be endorsed in blank by the consignor and
sent to his correspondent, but not intending thereby to have it transferred, and the person receiving the bill transfers it for value, the
title to the goods is not affected by the transaction. Lord Campbell, in delivering the judgment in that case, very explicitly denied
the negotiability of such instruments. In Corill vs. Hfill, 4 Denio,
323, Chief Justice Bronson had occasion to say-" If the master of
a vessel, after signing a bill of lading to the owner of the goods,
should give one to another person, it would confer no rights upon
those who were misled by the false and fraudulent paper." See
also, Tompson vs. -Dominey, 14 Mees. & W. 402; Zachrisson vs.
Ahman, 2 Sand. 68; Commercial Bank of Toc7hester vs. Cole, 15
Barb. 506.
It is conceded that Kyle, the first holder of -the certificate in
question, could assert no title to the stock it appears to represent,
and that in his hands it was spurious and void for all the reasons
which have been mentioned. Before its transfer to the plaintiffs can
be admitted to confer any better title upon them, it must be shown
to have not only all the negotiable qualities of a bill of lading, but
others also which that instrument does not possess.
Testing this question, therefore, in any conceivable mode, whether
by the express terms of these certificates, by their general nature and
character, by the authority of adjudged cases, or by the most favorable analogies, I have no hesitation in saying that the doctrine contended for is entirelywithout foundation. It is mainly by assuming
for these instruments the possession in a greater or lesser degree of
the peculiar qualities of negotiable securities, that the plaintiffs
claim to have acquired by transfer better rights than their assignor
had; and as that assumption fails, this claim falls to the ground.
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It was also said on the argument that these certificates of stock
are in the nature of renewal letters of credit, on the faith of which
any one might act; and upon this idea it was insisted that the defendants are in some way bound by the obligation in the hands of
the plaintiff. I am unable to see the analogy suggested. By attending to the mere definition of a letter of credit, it will be seen
there is no resemblance. Thus, in McCulloch's Commercial Dictionary, it is defined to be "a letter written by oye merchant or
correspondent to another, requesting him to credit the bearer with
a sum of money." Or, to take the further definition of another author, it is "an open or sealed letter from one merchant in one
place, directed to another in another place, requiring him that if
the person therein named or the bearer of the letter shall have occasion to buy commodities or want moneys, that he will procure the
same or pass his promise, bill or other engagement for it, on the
writer of the letter undertaking that he will provide him the money
for the goods, or repay him by exchange, or give him such satisfaction as he shall require." 3 Chitty Com. Law, 386 ; Bouvier's Law
Dictionary.
Now, while it may be the effect of a stock certificate to give the
holder a credit, its" terms do not request, invite or guarantee it. So
the possession of property of any description, or of the evidence and
muniments of title thereto, in their effect give to the possessor a
credit with other men. In this sense, every chose in action invites
a credit in favor of him who holds it, and so do the title deeds of
his real estate. Innocent parties may deal with him and be deceived. They may lend their money and lose it. Nothing more
than this can be said of a certificate of the ownership of stock in a
corporation. Regarded as a,promissory instrument, imposing obligations to be performed by the artificial person who makes it, it
is like any other chose in action, except as greater restrictions may
be placed upon its transfer and sale. Regarded as a muniment of
title, merely, it is like any other instrument by which title is manifested. But to say that, like %letter of credit, it contains a request
express or implied, addressed to any one in particular, or to the
community in general, to deal with or advance money to the holder,
47
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or that it contains any assurance or guarantee, addressed to the
dealer, of the safety of the transaction,-is in my judgment to confound plain and long settled distinctions.
I will now briefly examine the validity of the plaintiffs' title in
another aspect, still keeping out of view, however, the absolute want
of power in the corporation to create the stock in question. It has
been mentioned as one of *thereasons why the certificate was void
in the hands of Kyle, that Schuyler, the agent, was not acting within the scope of his powers when he issued it. The full effect of this
particular objection upon the plaintiffs' rights as the transferrees of
Kyle, has not been considered. And I observe now in the first
place, that if upon a vague theory of negotiability (already examined) they could overcome the difficulties arising out of the fraud
of the agent toward the company as his principal, and out of the
want of consideration, this objection would still have to be removed.
It is obvious upon a moment's reflection, that negotiability can impart no vitality to an instrument executed under a power, where the
agent has exceeded his actual or presumptive authority. Whoever
proposes to deal with a security of any kind appearing on its face
to be given by one man for another, is bound to inquire whether it
has been given by due authority; and if he omits that inquiry, he
deals at his peril.
It is not denied that the plaintiffs, in taking the certificate in
question, were chargeable with notice of the extent and limit of the
powers of Schuyler as transfer agent. All that is claimed in their
behalf is, that his act in issuing it was apparently and presumptively
although not actually, within his authority. Upon this ground it is
urged that, according to the rules which govern the relation of principal and agent, the defendants are bound in some way to make the
obligation good. The extent of the authority, it is admitted, the
plaintiffs knew, or were bound to know; but it was not known, they
say, that the act done was not within such authority.
There are in the books many loose expressions concerning the
distinction between a general and special agency. The distinction
itself is highly unsatisfactory, and will be found quite insufficient to
solve a great variety of cases. It is not profitable to dwell upon
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that distinction. Underlying the whole subject there is this fundamental proposition, that a principal is bound only by the authorized
acts of his agent. This authority may be proved by the instrument
which creates it; and beyond the terms of the instrument, or of the
verbal commission, it may be shown that the principal has held the
agent out to the world in other instances as having an authority
which will embrace the particular act in question. I know of no
other mode in which a controverted power can be established. But
in whichever way this is done, it cannot be limited by secret instruction; of the principal on the one hand, nor can it be enlarged by
the unauthorized representation of the agent on the other. These
principles, I think, are elementary.
But suppose an agent is authorized by the terms of his appointment to enter into an engagement, or series of engagements, on behalf of his principal, and while the appointment is in force he fraudulently makes one in his own or a stranger's business, but in the
form contemplated by the power, and which he asserts to be in the
business of his employer, by using his name in the contract, can the
dealer rely upon that assertion and hold the principal, or is he bound
to inquire and to ascertain at his peril whether the transaction is
not only in appearance but in fact within the authority? According to the authority of the Supreme Court of this State, in the case
of Iie IAorth River Bank vs. Aymar, 3 Hill, 262, he can. There
the agent was authorized to draw and endorse notes in the name and
for the benefit of his principal. He drew various notes, which in
their appearance were within the power, but really had no connection with the business of his principal. The plaintiff,-Bank,which had the letter of attorney in its custody, discounted them;
and it was held they could be recovered against the principal. Justice Cowen and Chief Justice Nelson delivered opposing ,opinions,
in which the question is very elaborately discussed. The decision
is reversed in the Court of Errors; but the case is not reported in
that court. If the reversal proceeded, as I suppose it must, upon a
doctrine directly opposite to that held by the Supreme Court, then
the case certainly suggests a limit of great importance to the liability of principals, the recognition of which would be decisive of the
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present controversy. So, in Grant vs. 'orway, 10 C. B. 665, it
was held, after full discussion, that the master of a ship signing a
bill of lading for goods not actually shipped, was not to be considered the'agent of the owner of the vessel, so as to make him responsible to the one who made advances upon faith of the bill.
That is a strong case. The master of the ship is general agent of
the owners as to all matters within the scope of his duty and employment, and has unquestionable power to sign bills of lading for
goods shipped; and every bill asserts, as it did in that case, that the
goods are received on board. The act, therefore, judged by its' appearance and the representation of the agent was stribtly within the
power. But the principal was held not to be liable; because it was
not so in fact. The doctrine of that case was affirmed by the English Court of Exchequer in Hubertseq vs. Ward, 8 Exchequer
Rep. 380; S. 0. 18 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 551, and again with
great deliberation by the Common Pleas in Coleman vs. BicJes,
29 Eng. Law and Eq. Rep. 323.
The distinction is not always attended to, between the apparent
powers of an agent and his acts apparently but not really within
the'power. An agent's apparent powers are those which are confirmed by the terms of his appointment, notwithstanding secret instructions, or those with which he is clothed by the character in
which he is held out to the world, although not strictly within his
commission. Whatever is done under an authority thus manifested
is actually within the authority; and the principal is bound for that
reason. But it is obvious that an agent may clothe his act with all
the indicia of authority, and yet the act itself may not be within
the real or apparent power. The appearance of the power is one
thing; and for that the principal is responsible. The appearance
of the act is another; and for that, if responsible, I think the remedy
is against the agent only. The fundamental proposition, I repeat,
is that one man can be bound only by the authorized acts of another.
He cannot be charged because another one holds a commission from
him, and falsely asserts that his acts are within it.
Cases may often arise which to a casual observation might appear
to be within the principles stated, but which really are not. Thus, an
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agent may be authorized to give notes f6r his principal in order to
raisemoney to be used in the business of the latter. A third person may inspect the power, advance the money in good faith, and
the agent appropriate it to his own use. In such a case, I should
hold the principal responsible, not because the act of the agent appeared to be within the authority, butbecause the authority actually
included the transaction. A power given to an agent to borrow
money, upon notes or- otherwise, implies, that the money may be
paid to him, and so the whole transaction is strictly and literally
authorized. But- suppose tle power to give the, note is on its face
conditional. It then has no existence until the condition has been
-fulfilled. To a confiding-dealer who believes that the agent would
not do an improper act, the note will certainly carry the appearance of due authority; but if it turns out that the conditions had
not occurred -on whicli t!;e exercise of the power depended;' then he
was trusting to the representation of the agent, and; I think, must
'look to him alone. As the principal never authorized the transaction at all, he is bound'neither-by the contract nor the representation. If not by the former, then it is extremely plain he is not by
the latter.
Connected with the observations last mad, it is proper, though
perhaps scarcely necessary, to notice another d6ctrine which has
been much urged, under some disguise it is true, but in effect that
the very employment of an agent in situations of' trust and confldence is a- recommendation and certificate of his character, so that
if he deceives others to their injury, the principal must make compensation. If by this it were only meant that where- the agent is
guilty of fraud or deceit in doing his employer's business, the latter
is responsible, the doctrine is entirely true. (Story's Agency, sec.
482, and cases cited.) But in all its other aspects and forms of statement the doctrine is unsound. If the agentin dealing for his principal;
and within the power, commits a fraud, the principal is liable, not
upon the ground that he holds the agent out to the world as an
honest man, but because the fraud enters into and is a part of the
authorized transaction. If the agent deals dishonestly for his principal, it is in a just sense a wrong done by the principal himself,
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although unknown and unauthorized. But the dealing itself must be
authorized. If the transaction is not within the power, then as the
dealing is imputed to the agent personally, so necessarily are all the
circumstances attending it, and all the means and instrumentalities
by which the fraud is consummated. The power of the agent to
charge his principal by doing a wrong, must be traced directly to
his authority; and it cannot be referred to an increased facility for
imposing on the credulity of others Fderived incidentally from his
appointment to a situation of trust. If the fraud consists in an
over-representation of his power to act, by which others are drawn
into dealing with him, then it is a self-evident proposition, that a
man can no more enlarge than he can create a power by such a
representation.
Applying the principles which have been stated in this branch of
the discussion, they are decisive against the plaintiffs. If the corporation had held stock, and Schuyler had been the agent to sell it
and issue certificates therefor, a sale and a certificate issued by him
would have been valid against his principals, although by a private
fraud he appropriated the proceeds to his own use. The transaction with the purchaser in all its branches, the sale, the certificate,
and the payments to him of the money, would have been not only
apparently but actually within the powers. His misappropriation
of the proceeds would have been a mere breach of trust relating to
money in his hands, and upon the principles of trust, his intention
to misappropriate would not affect afi innocent party.
But such were not the relations between Schuyler and the corporation, nor was he held out to the world as standing in such relations. He had no power to sell stock at all, and none to issue certificates, except as incidental to a sale between existing stockholders;
and then it depended on the conditions precedent to a transfer on
the books, and a surrender of a previous certificate for the same
stock. The authority which he assumed to exercise, therefore, confessedly never had an actual existence, and, within the principles
which have been stated, it never had an apparent existence. His
appointment, in its very terms, which all dealers are supposed to
have been acquainted with, did not include his acts; and there is no

MECHANICS BANK vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

pretence that the authority it conferred was ever enlarged by any
holding out or recognition of such acts. All that can b.e said in
behalf of the plaintiffs is, that the certificate itself implied a representation or assurance that it was issued within the power,-in other
words, that the conditions on which the power depended had been
fulfilled. Even this representation when closely scanned, was no
more than an inference of the dealer that, as the agent had no authority to certify except under conditions, those had been in fact
performed. But the conclusive answer is, that the defendants never
authorized any such representations. To say that they had, would
be simply saying that they authorized the certificate, because the
representation was contained in that and existed nowhere else, and
this would be assuming the very point in dispute. The representation of assurance, therefore,*if such we call it, was the unauthorized
act of the agent. Upon this the plaintiffs naturally no doubt relied;
and so, doubtless, the dealer did upon the bill of lading, in Norway
vs. Grant (8upra), which contained an express declaration that the
goods were shipped. The precise difficulty is that they relied upon
the appearance which the agent gave to the act,, and by that they
were deceived. They were under no deception as to the power in
its real or apparent scope. Testing the question by any rule of
agency with which I am acquainted, the defendants were not bound
by the transaction.
If any one of the main conclusions at which I have arrived in
this discussion is sound, there is no remaining ground on which the
action can be sustained. Viewing the certificate in question as
unaffected by the want of power in the corporation to create or
recognize the stock it appears to represent, we have seen that it
was void in its origin, because issued without consideration and in
fraud of the defendants' rights.
We have also seen that those objections were equally fatal to its
validity in the hands of the plaintiffs, as the assignees of the first
holder. It has been further shown that the instrument imposed no
obligation or duty on the defendants upon the more special ground
that the act of Schuyler, in issuing it was not within any authority
which they ever, in fact or in pretence, conferred upon him as their
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agent; and, if this objection is sound, the further observation has
been made, and, I doubt not, assented to, that it cannot be overcome by allowing to the certificate the transferable quality and
immunity which belong to negotiable paper. Unless these conclusions can be overthrown, they are subversive of the entire ground of
action.
The notion of estoppel which has been advanced in the argument,
not as a distinct ground of liability, but blended with other principles, deserves by itself very little consideration. Every corporate,
as -well as private obligation or instrument, undoubtedly contains
an express or implied representation of facts, upon the faith of
which innocent parties may deal. If it be a promissory note, value
received is a fact expressed or implied; and although the fact may
not be so, the maker is bound to pay the obligation in the hands of
an innocent third party, not upon any theory of estoppel, but upon
principles peculiar to that species of security. Where the instrument is not negotiable, the maker may, as I have heretofore observed, be affected by an estoppel in pais, if it be transferred upon
his representation of its validity, and the dealer acts upon that
representation. But to say that he is estopped by the instrument
itself simply because he made it and a third party has dealt with it,
is only asserting in another form, that fraud, mistake, duress, illegality, want of consideration, or want of authority when the act is
one of pretended agency, is not denied. This would subvert the
settled maxim that the assignee or purchaser takes subject to all
equities between the original parties. It would also subvert another
maxim which belongs to the doctrine of estoppel itself. That
maxim is, that an admission or representation is no estoppel in favor
of a stranger to whom it is not made, and whose conduct it was not
expressly designed to influence (3 Johns. Cases, 101; 6 Hill, 534;
8 id. 215; 7 Barb. 644). The result is, that before the principles
of estoppel can be applied to the controversy, it must be asserted
and proved that a certificate of stock, differing from all other
modes and forms of obligation used in the transactions of men, contains within itself a representation or admission of facts which any
dealer, however remote from the original parties, may accept as

MECHANICS BANK vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

addressed to himself, and intended to influence his conduct. For
such a doctrine, no authority has been cited, and it has no foundation in any principle hitherto recognized.
As I have once mentioned, a theory of the action prominently
urged upon the argument, assumed that the corporation had no
power to create more than the original three millions of stock, or to
issue certificates for a greater amount. That this is so, I think I
have demonstrated. But, assuming these premises, it was then
insisted that the certificate in question was therefore false, and that
the action would be on this ground. The essential principle of the
case in this view would be, that, as the defendants, for want of corporate powers, cannot recognize the certificate as the true representation of stock,, and so respond to the engagement which it
implies, they must make compensation in damages for the injury
sustained in consequence of the representation regarded as false.
Now, by presenting the falsewod alleged in the certificate and
the consequent injury as the ground of the action, a plausible
appearance is given to this view of the case. But it is essentially
illogical. The falsehood, viewed in this aspect alone, really consists
in a want of corporate power to enter into the engagement; and
that, instead of being a cause of the action is a serious difficulty to
be removed. If an agent, irrespective of all questions arising out
of the special limitations of his own authority as derived from the
board of directors, cannot bind a corporation, or affect the rights of
its geniune stockholders, by the terms of an over-issued certificate,
there is great difficulty in affirming that the result may be indirectly
reached by thus changing the ground of liability. If a corporation
has received the benefit of its agent's misrepresentation or fraud in
a. transaction unauthorized by its charter, I will not say there is no
mode of redress. I am not an advocate of the doctrine that a corporation cannot be responsible for a wrong, or may not in some
form, be liable when its agents enter into engagements which its
charter forbids, and the benefits of the transaction can be traced to
its stockholders, or are held for their benefit. But such is not the
case before us. The stockholders of this corporation are in nowise
connected with the misconduct of their agent, nor have they been
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benefited by it. It is true they trusted him, but it is not alleged
that they had not ample reasons for so doing. Conceding that
Schuyler's authority, derived from his appointment as transfer agent
by the board of directors, might apparently include his fraudulent
acts, the difficulty is only removed one step further back. The
directors themselves were not the corporation, but its agents only.
It may be granted that they wielded all the corporate powers; but
among those powers the one in question is nowhere to be found.
It did not even have apparent existence. The argument concedes
this absolute want of power; and I have yet to discover the principle on which the genuine stockholders can be made liable in any
form for an attempt to exercise it by any of their agents for their
own individual benefit.
But such a point need not be determined. Before reaching this
ultimate question, the action fails upon the special grounds which
have been examined at large. Conceding to the defendants the
power, if they so elect, to recognize and perform the obligation
under which their agent attempted to place them, then, if they are
not liable upon their refusal to do so for the reasons which have
been stated, it is extremely plain they are not if the power to do so
is wanting. To say that their agent's false representation of stock
which did not and could not exist, can render them liable to dealers
in the spurious certificates, when they would not be bound to recognize the same dealers if the stock in fact existed, and the representations were therefore true, involves a fallacy so evident that it
needs only to be suggested. This is the error in the argument
which places the defendants' liability on the simple ground that the
certificate is a fraudulent representation of non-existing stock, the
alleged fraud consisting in the statement of that falsehood alone.
In this view of the controversy, the other fatal objections to the
action are overlooked. If I have been successful in showing that
the plaintiffs can have no title to the shares of stock mentioned in
the certificate, for the particular reasons which have been given,
then manifestly the non-existence of the shares, or the false assertion of their existence, is no ground of complaint.
In concluding, it is proper to say that the case of The .Bank of
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Eenitucky vs. Tie Schuylkill Bank (Parsons' Select Eq. Cases,
180) has not been overlooked. That case has been much relied on
as an authority in point upon the general question before us; and it
is certainly true, that in the opinion delivered on pronouncing the
judgment, some principles were stated scarcely reconcilable with the
conclusion to which we have come. In that case, however, the suit
was brought by the corporation against its own fraudulent agent,
after it had recognized the spurious issue under an enabling act of
the legislature; and in many essential circumstances the controversy
differed from the present one. After a careful consideration, we
are unable to yield to that decision any controlling influence upon
the question now to be determined. We are all of opinion that the
judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted. Ordered
accordingly.

In the ,Superior Court of Cineinnati-GeneralTerm, .2Tov. 1855.
MATILDA CAMPBELL, ADINISTRATRIX OF ROBERT CAMPBELL, DECEASED,'
PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, VS. PATRICK ROGERS ET AL.

1

1. An action cannot be maintained by the administrator, or 6ther personal representative of a deceased party, under the Statute of March 25, 1851, requiring compensation for causing death by wrongful act. neglect, or default, when the act causing the death occurred without the State.
2. That Statute applies only to those cases, where the wrongful act, neglect, or default,
causing death, has occured within the State.

Robert Campbell, the plaintiff's intestate, while employed by the
defendants, as engineer on board the steamboat "Fort Henry,"
was drowned in the Ohio River, in October 1854. When the accident occurred, the boat was navigating the river without the jurisdiction of the State of Ohio; and the deceased fell overboard while
on duty. It is charged in the petition that he lost his life by the
negligent conduct of the officers and crew of the steamboat, who in
their efforts to save him were not only careless, but by their want of
This case is reported in 2 Handy's Rep. 110, and we are under obligation to the
Reporters for the sheets.
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skill in the management of the vessel, caused one of its wheels to
strike the deceased, while struggling in the water, and thereby produced his death. It is also stated the boat was not provided with
suitable yawls or other small boats, as required by the Act of Congress, passed August 30th, 1852, entitled "An Act to amend an
Act to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on
board of vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, and for
other purposes." In consequence of this omission, it is also stated,
the usual means to save persons from drowning could not be applied.
The plaintiff, who is the widow of the deceased, obtained letters
of administration upon her husband's estate, from the Probate Court
of Campbell County, Kentucky, where he resided; and now brings
her action against the defendant, to recover damage for the loss of
her husband, under the law of Ohio, passed March 25th, 1851,
requiring " compensation for causing death by wrongful act, neglect,
or default,"' On the trial of the case before Judge Gholson, at
special term, the court gave the following, among other charges to
the Jury: "That if they should believe from the evidence, the
I The following is a copy of the Ohio Act:
An act requiring compensation for causing death by wrongful act, neglector default.
Passed March 25, 1851. (Swan's Stat. 1854, p. 707.)
SECTIoN 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or defaul% and
the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action, and recover damages, in respect thereof;
then and in every such case the person who, or the corporation which would have
been liable, if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been
caused under such circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or second
degree or manslaughter.
SECT. 2. Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal
representatives of such deceased person; and the amount recovered in every such
action, shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow, and next of kin, in the proportions provided by law, in relation to the distribution of personal estates, left by
persons dying intestate; and in every such action, the jury may give such damages
as they shall deem fair and just, not exceeding five thousand dollars, with reference
to the pecuniary injury resulting from such death to the wife and next of kin to
such deceased: Provided that every such action shall be commenced within two
years after the death of such deceased person.
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injury resulting in the death of the intestate was inflicted or happened without the State of Ohio, and that the intestate did not reside,
or have his domicil or usual place of residence in Ohio, then no
action could be brought under the statute of 1851 ; and independent
of that statute, no action could be brought for al injury resulting
in the death of the intestate, by his personal representative."
The plaintiff's counsel excepted to this charge, as well as the
others given by the judge, but to which it is not necessary now to
refer; a verdict having been found for the defendant, a motion was
made for a new trial, alleging among other causes, that the court
erred charging the law to the jury; the motion was overruled, and
judgment entered on the verdict; to all which exceptions were also
taken, and are fully set forth on the record.
The plaintiff now seeks to reverse the judgment of the court in
special term.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
STORER, J.-The law, as affirmed by the judge in his charge to the
jury, presents the only question for our decision. It lies at the threshhold of the case, and our judgment upon it must dispose of the controversy between the parties.
We have already held in Worlell vs. The Oin. Ham. . -Dayton
R. B. Co. 1 Handy, 481, that an action will not lie at common law
by the representative of a deceased person to recover damages for
his death, and, our opinion is unchanged. We have found no American authority to the contrary since our decision wa3 made, but
believe the course of decision in all the States is in harmony with
our own. In England the law has been so universally admitted,
that we need not again refer to the cases where it has been adjudicated. We may be permitted, however, to quote the language of
Mr. Smith, in his notes to Ashiby vs. White et al., 2 Leading
Oases, 131: "Before the recent act of Parliament, 9 and 10 Vict.,
oh. 93, for compensating the families of persons killd by accidents,
no action at law was maintainable against a person, who by his
wrongful act, neglect, or default, caused the death of another,
though under circumstances vhich would have given the sufferer a
right of action, had he survived; and the husband, wife, parent, or
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children of the deceased were without remedy against the wrongdoer,
by whom they had been deprived of comfort and support."
It is sought, however, very ingeniously, to maintain this action,
and to claim the benefit of the statute, on the ground that the wife
always had by the law of nature a right to indemnity for the loss
of her husband, and whenever a remedy is provided, as it is contended has been furnished by the statute, the right then existing
will be thereby upheld and enforced.
The proposition thus asserted involves another, that if admitted,
the remedy may be claimed within any jurisdiction where the wrongdoer can be served with process; and the result must necessarily be,
that it is immaterial where the act took place, which caused the
decedent's death. In such a case the venue would be transitory,
and the judicial tribunals of any State or country may take cognizance of the complaint.
A very able exposition of what are urged to be our natural rights
has been submitted by counsel, and the various relations we sustain
to our race very skillfully examined and discussed; but sitting as a
court of law, established bylaw, and deriving our power to adjudicate wholly from the law, however instructive and curious are the
distinctions made in the argument, we cannot appreciate their application, nor admit their soundness; nor can we regard the maxim
"ubi jus, ibi remedium," urged upon us with so much zeal; as a
license on our part to disregard established rules, to create a new
remedy, and certainly not to provide a new right of action.
When we become members of any civil or political organization,
we look alone to the government under which we live to provide
the means of protection for our persons and property. If these
means prove inadequate, the law-making power must be invoked, to
furnish a sufficient remedy, and if necessary, confer a right that
did not exist before; It never could be permitted that the party
aggrieved might assume a right to exist, and provide also a remedy
to enforce it; such an admission would take from the legislature the
power to enact the law, and from the courts the authority to
expound it.
There always have been, and ever must be, in the imperfect
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administration of human law, many cases of hardship, indeed of
great suffering, where no relief can be given by the courts, and
these cases will continue to occur -while the business of the world is
subject to so many changes, and is conducted by such a diversity
of instruments. ".Damnum absque injuria," are, in legal parlance,
household words, recognized as a settled rule of judicial action,
which must determine all questions to which it properly applies,
however apparently unjust may seem its application.
Instances might be multiplied, in which wrongs the most grievous
are without legal redress, Thus the seduction of a minor daughter,
not in her father's service, actual or constructive, furnishes no right of
action to the parent, and the injured party herself is without
remedy. However erroneous may be the opinion of the judge who
decides a legal controversy; however unfit he may be to hold a seat
on the bench; however ruinous to the fortunes of suitors may be
his judgments, he is yet protected by the same law he has not the
capacity to expound; unless he has mingled malice with his ignorance,
he enjoys perfect indemnity. And so the owner of land, while excavating the soil, though immediately adjoining his neighbor's property,
if he is guilty of no wanton or careless act, cannot be held to answer
in damages, though'the consequence of the excavation may be the
falling of an adjacent building. His act may have produced the
injury, but it was his privilege to occupy and improve his own estate,
and only when he shall have abused the right, can he be made
responsible.
Perhaps a more familiar, and yet striking illustration of the
maxim, may be found in the rule, that compels the creditor of the
general government, or of a State, to ask as a favor what he certainly should be permitted to demand as a right. The slow and
uncertain remedy by petition to the legislature is the only mode of
relief, and too often when it is sought, the simplest justice is either
postponed, or utterly denied. It cannot then be predicated, from
the assumption of the existence of a natural right, that it necessarily
follows there is always a remedy.
The case of Ashby vs. White et al., Lord Raymond, 938, is generally cited to exemplify the rule, that where there is a right, there is
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a remedy ; but it was not contended by the counsel then, nor held
by the court, when it was heard and decided in the King's Bench,
nor when it was finally determined in the House of Lords, 1 Bro.
Parl. Cas. 4S, that there was any other than legal rights, of which
the judicial tribunals could take cognizance.
In Paisley vs. Freeman, 3 T. R. 45, the judge lays down the
rule, " that where cases are new in their principle, it is necessary
to have recourse to legislative interposition to remedy the grievance;
but were the case is only new in the instance, and the only question
is upon the application of a principle recognized in the law to such
now case, it will be just as competent for the courts to apply the
principle to any case that may arise two centuries hence, as it was
two centuries ago."
The same ruling is found in Russell vs. Re .Menof Deven, 2
T. R. 667. It was there held that no foundation existed, upon
which the action could be supported, and if it had been intended,
the legislature would have interfered and given a remedy. And
Lord Kenyon, in. referring to the Statute of Winton, to illustrate
the principle decided, remarked, "that the reason of the statute
was, as the hundred were bound to keep watch and ward, it was
supposed that those irregularities which led to robbery, must have
happened by their neglect; but it never was imagined that the hundred could have been compelled to make satisfaction, until the statute giving the remedy was passed; and undoubtedly no action could
be maintained before that time."
Tn Le 6auz vs. -Eden, 2 Douglass, 60f, where an action of trespass was brought, for taking a vessel at sea as a prize, upon the
question being made, whether such an action would lie, it was determined that "inasmuch as there never had been an action brought
in such a case, a case that must have frequently occurred if such an
action would lie, that circumstance went strongly to show the general opinion of the profession to be, that no such action would lie."
The same argument is very elaborately urged by Dallas, Oh. Jus. in
deciding the case of the _Duke of New Castle vs. Clark, 8 Taunton,
620 ; and by Beardsly, J'us. in Cosi6gan vs. The Mohawk J-_lud.
Railroad,2 Denio, 609.
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From the examination of the cases we have quoted, as upon general principles, we must conclude, that where there is no clearly
defined legal right, there can be no remedy; and where a right not
before existing is created by statute, and a remedy given,,the right
can alone be asserted in the mode authorized by the statute. Neither
the common law, nor, the law of nature can be appealed to to sustain
the right or aid the remedy ; Miller vs. Taylor, 4 Burrows, 2320;
Naity of Boston vs. ,S'haw, 1 Metcalf, 138; Moncrief vs. Ely, 17
Wendell, 405.
The Statute upon which this suit is brought is in derogation of
the common law and the practice of the courts, in that it confers
upon-the personal representative a right hitherto unknown. Had
the decedent when living commenced his action for a personal injury,.
it would have abated by his death, and of course there would be ne
survivorship to the heir or administrator; and it never has been
supposed that damages for torts to the person, not yet reduced to a
judgment, were "b ona notabilia" to give jurisdiction to the Court
of Probate, or a fund-for the benefit of creditors. Yet the legislature have practically declared that the action survives, and damages
may be recovered, though the injured party has deceased. The
remedy is not given to the wife, the child, or any near relative but
conferred upon the personal representative alone, who is thereby
invested with a new character. He is no longer the administrator
merely of the decendent's estate, to collect and distribute tha assets,
but is made the trustee of others, who alone are interested in tlie
new relation he sustains. His duties are changed, for he cannot be
controlled by the general law prescribing his conduct, nor held
responsible for the execution of his trust, by the Court of Probate.
The introduction of a principle so anomalous, we cannot but think,
not only gives an extraordinary remedy, but clearly creates a new
right of action.
We are thus brought to the only remaining question.: can a foreigv
administrator, for the death of a non-resident intestate, where
the act producing it occurred without the State, be allowed the
benefit of the statute ?
By the § 236 of the law of 1840, foreign executors and adminis48
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trators are permitted to sue in our courts, and thus enjoy a privilege that would otherwise depend on comity only. When they seek
the aid of our tribunals to enforce foreign contracts, no relief will
be granted, if the courts where the cause of action first arose would
not have upheld them; if the agreement was void by the lez loci,
it will not be enforced by the lexfori; and so if there is no right to
recover for an alleged injury in the State where it is said to have
been committed, there can be none in any other State. It cannot
be argued that the character of the act producing the injury, excepts the case from the general principle; but on the contrary,
every claim that is attempted to be asserted in Ohio, which had its
origin in Kentucky, must have been authorized by her laws. If
they do not recognize its existence, it has no legal vitality here.
The record before us establishes the fact, that the decedent came
to his death on the Ohio river, between the States of Kentucky and
Indiana; and if the right of action then accrued, it must have been
permitted by the laws of one or the other of these States, as the
jurisdiction of both was mutual and co-ordinate over the subject.
In neither of those States could the wife or children of the decedent have sued at common law, for the loss of the husband, or
the father. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky so decided, in
Eden vs. -Lexington&FrankfortRailroad Company, 12 B. Munroe,
204, and we understand the same doctrine is held in Indiana; and
in neither State was there a statute like ours, conferring a right of
action upon the personal representative.
Would it then be just to the courts of these States, or to our own
citizens, to extend the provisions of our statute to those for whom it
was not enacted, and whose claims it was never intended to embrace ? We believe this statute was passed to protect those within
our jurisdiction, and who were thus subject to our laws ; not to include torts committed in other States. Any other construction
might apply the very stringent penalties of the "Act of 1854, to
provide against the evils resulting from the sale of intoxicating
liquors," to every State in the Union, and permit the results of intoxication in Maine or California to be measured by a rule that did
not exist where the drunkenness was occasioned. The person who
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may have caused the injury, need only be found in Ohio, and the
retribution of our statute will be visited upon him. Such we cannot believe is the law.
We cannot take notice of the criminal codes of our sister States,
nor enforce the penalties they impose, nor can our courts punish an
offence comitted without our jurisdiction, and so far has this rule
been extended, that in Indiana vs. Johns et al., 5 Ohio, 217, it was
held that a suit could not be maintained upon a penal bond given
in another State, where its breach subjected the obligor to a statutory penalty. See also The Antelope, 10 Wheaton, 66-123;
Scoville vs. Canfield, 14 Johns. 338-840; Folliott vs. Ogden, 1
H. Black. 135.
When the legislature of Mississippi, a few years since, declared
that the survivor, in a duel, should be compelled to support the
family of his victim, it never was supposed that the law was extra
territorial, and we have yet to learn, that the survivor in any fatal rencontre, in the States contiguous, was held amenable to the penalty,
should he afterwards have become a resident of Mississippi.
This example presents perhaps an extreme case, but it clearly
proves, we think, the general rule, that no such action could be
maintained.
We have already stated, that the plaintiff could not maintain an
action like the present, in either of the States having jurisdiction
over the offence complained of, at the time it was committed. No
such right as that now asserted existed; but by the law of Ohio, the
personal representative is made the trustee of the decedent's kindred, among whom the damages, when recovered, are to be distributed; and it necessarily follows, that the foreign administrator, if
allowed to sue in Ohio, must be subject to the same rule; and yet it
is difficult to understand, how the plaintiff, who derives all her power
from the Probate Court in Kentucky, and is accountable only to the
tribunal where she has given her bond, can claim a new character,
and assume new relations in Ohio. The damages in the event of a
recovery would be assets in her hands, to be distributed as required
by the law of the domicil, not of the forum. No trust exists by virtue of any statute of Kentucky, and we cannot perceive how those
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who would be entitled by the law of Ohio to participate in the fund,
could compel a distribution. The law of descents here is the rule
presented, and yet it would be a novel doctrine, if the heirs of the
decedent could take their share of his personal estate by any other
rule than that which prevails in Kentucky.
We have examined the question before us in all its phases, with
an anxious desire to ascertain the true rule of decision, in a case
that is at once novel and interesting. Our researches have
thoroughly convinced us that the plaintiff has no right to maintain
the action, and the judge, in so affirming the law, committed no
error. We hold, the statute of 1851 has no extra territorial jurisdiction; that it was intended to operate only in this State ; that it
created a new right of action, and furnished a new remedy, neither
of which can be extended to the present case.
The principle upon which we decide the question, has been recognized by the Supreme Court, in the construction they have given to
the law of 1840, "1authorizing the collection of claims against steamboats." In Champion vs. Janitzen, 16 Ohio 91; Goodsell vs. &.
Louis, ib. 178, itwas held no extra territorial jurisdiction could be
claimed under the statute; its provisions were intended to operate,
and could only operate within the State, or the waters bordering on
the State.
And we but affirm the same rule, when we apply it to the present
action.
The judgment at special term is affirmed.
Ketchum &¢1eadington, for plaintiff.
Lincoln, Smith J- Warnock, for defendant.

DUNHAM vs. LAMPHERE.

In the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
1

DANIEL DUNHAM vs. PRENTICE LAMHERE.

An act regulating the time and manner of taldng fish in the sea, within the territorial
limits of the State, is within the authority of the State legislature, andbinding on
citizens of other States, and on vessels enrolled and licensed as flihing vessels
under the laws of the United States.

The facts of this case, which was argued by
L. .. Brigham, for the plaintiff, and
T. -D. Robinson, for the defendant,
Are stated in the opinion, which -was delivered at Nantucket, at
July term, 1856, by
SHAW,. . .- The facts, upon which the decision of the present
case depends, are few and simple, and are in no respect controverted. The right of fishipig on the sea-coast, and in the bays,
coves and arms of the sea, within the territorial limits of the State,
and the power of regulating the fisheries within these limits, cannot
fail to be regarded as subjects of deep interest by a maritime people,
bordering as this Commonwealth to a great extent does, on the
shores of the sea.
This is an action brought by the plaintiff as fishwarden of Nantucket, against the defendant as the owner and master of a small
fishing vessel, to recover a penalty alleged to have been incurred
by the violation of a statute made for regulating'certain fisheries on
the shores of Nantucket and several small islands adjacent. The
action is founded on St. 1850, o. 6. The first section prdvides that,
from and after the 1st of July 1850, it shall not be lawful for any
person to take any fish, by seining, within one mile from the shores
of Nantucket, Tuckernuck, Smith's Muskeeket and Gravel Islands.
Section 2 relates to clams and horsefeet, and other bait, and is not
applicable to this case. Section 3 declares a forfeiture of $50 for
each offence. Section 4 authorizes the town of Nantucket to
appoint fishwardens, 'whose duty it shall be to prosecute for every
offence. Section 5 authorizes the seizure of boats employed in
IFrom

8 Gray's Reports 268, not yet published.

DUNHAM vs. LAMPHERE.

violation of the act; and section 6 directs that all penalties shall
go, one half to the treasurer of Nantucket and the other half to the
complainant, and be recovered in an action of debt, in any court
proper to try the same.
The declaration charges the violation of this law, by taking fifty
or more bass, by seining, on the 29th of July, 1852, within one
mile of Gravel Island.
The defendant, by his answer, alleges that he resides in Westerly,
in the State of Rhode Island; that in the summer of 1852 he came
into this State, having obtained from the government of the United
States a license to pursue in these waters the cod and other fisheries ;
admits that he took, as alleged, certain bass, as he thinks, within
one mile of Gravel Island, by seining; and alleges that in the act
of seining he acted in pursuance of this license, and honestly believed
that the legislature of this State had no right to interfere with and
deprive him of his right acquired by such license. He afterwards
made an additional answer, to this effect; that, whatever construction the court may give to his license, he will contend that the law
of the State, above cited, is unconstitutional, and that the legislature
of the State, have no right to qualify or restrain the right of subjects of other States to fish in that part of the sea where the alleged
seining took place.
The fact of taking fish by a seine within a mile of the shore of
Gravel Island, which constitutes part of the territory of the State,
after the act went into operation, is plainly contrary to the letter of
the statute, and leaves the only question to be whether the statute
itself has the force of law. Being within a mile of the shore, puts
it beyond doubt that it was within the territorial limits of the State,
although there might in many cases be some difficulty in ascertain:ing precisely where that limit is. We suppose the rule to be, that
these limits extend a. marine league or three geographical miles,
from the shore; and in ascertaining the line of shore, this limit does
not follow each narrow inlet or arm of the sea; but when the inlet
is so narrow that persons and objects can be discerned across it by
the naked eye, the line of territorial jurisdiction stretches across
from one headland to the other inlet. Commomwealh vs. Peters,
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12 Met. 387; United States vs. Bevens, 8 Wheat. 886. "The
jurisdiction of a State," says Marshall, C. J., in 3 Wheat. 886, 387,
"is coextensive with its territory; coextensive with its legislative
power." When it is doubtful whether an event occured within or
without this line, it is a question of fact, to be settled by proof;
and this may sometimes make it a difficult question. But no such
question of fact arises here. The only question is, and so it is
ultimately put by the defendant in his answer, whether the act prohibiiing fishing with seines, at the place in question, is constitutional,
and such as the legislature bad just power and authority to make.
The privilege and benefit of the fisheries on the shores or coasts of
the sea, has in all times been regarded as a valuable advantage,
both as a means of subsistence and a source of commerce, in all
civilized communities. Like other valuable commodities, fish, as
well swimming as shell-fish, are susceptible of being property; and
every such thing, says Vattel, bk. 1. §§ 284, 235, is considered as
belonging to the nation that possesses the country, as forming part
of the aggregate mass of its wealth; those not divided are called
public property; they were denominated res communes, such as air,
water, the sea, fish, wild beasts. Thus it appears that, though
some commodities are more susceptible than others of specific appropriation and separate use and enjoyment, yet it is their utility and
value, and not the specific appropriation to individuals or particular
companies, which makes them property. They may be divided and
appropriated, or held and used in common, as the sovereign power
to which they belong may determine to be most convenient and
beneficial.
By the common law of England, now too well known to require
any considerable citation of authorities, the right of fishing on the
shores of the sea, and in all creeks and coves, is common to all the
subjects of the realm, with a few exceptions where an exclusive
right had been acquired by a grant from the king in very early
times, or where special regulations have been made by act of parliament. Indeed, this subject has been so recently discussed by this
court in the case of Weston vs. Sampson, 8 Cush. 847, that it may
be sufficient to refer to it, and the authorities there cited; for though
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the specific question there was the common right of digging clams,
yet the inquiry necessarily involved the more general right of
taking any and all kinds of fish on the shores and in th6 arms of
the sea. In that inquiry we -were led to the conclusion, that,
although the fits privatum or right of soil was in the king, yet it
was so held in trust for the public; and that the right of fishing in
the sea, and in all the arms of the sea, and in tide waters, was common to all English subjects.
Supposing then that the right both of property and dominion over
the sea-shore, within the territorial limits of a sovereign State, and
all its incidents-navigation, fishing, and all other incidental benefits-belong to such sovereign State, to be divided among its members and held in severalty, or used and enjoyed in common, as the
governing power of such State, constitutionally exercised, shall determine; then the question is, in these United States, where the
governing power over the same people is constitutionally exercised,
in part by the government of the United States, and in part by the
several State governments, each supreme and exclusive within its
proper and constitutional limits, whether the right of property
and of dominion and government over the sea-coast fisheries, and
all fisheries in tide waters and arms of the sea, belong properly to
the general government, or remain with the State government.
This subject has lately undergone full discussion in this court, in
considering a kindred subject, that of the nature and limits of the
rights of proprietors of lands bounding on the sea. Comnonwealth
vs. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. It was considered and determined on what
we then conceived and still believe to be ample authority, that whatever right of dominion and sovereignty on this subject remained in
the crown, whilst these States were colonies and provinces of Great
Britain, and owed allegiance to the king, no right either of property
or dominion remained after the acknowledgment of our independence by a treaty, sanctioned as it was by act of parliament. And
we further determined that the dominion and controlling power over
the sea-coast, its shores and tide waters, thus absolutely renounced
and relinquished by the government of Great Britain, and which
must vest somewhere, did, as between the United States and the
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several States respectively, fully and absolutely vest in the several
States. This had been definitely settled by the Supreme Court of
the United States, in lew Orleans vs. United States, 10 Pet. 662.
Pollard vs. Hagan, 3 How. 212.
One other point was considered in the case of Commonwealth vs.
Alger, 7 Cush. 82, 83, which may be of importance in this discussion; and that turned on the distinction at common law between
grants and other acts done by the king in virtue of his royal prerogative, and such as could rightfully be done by the general govern4
ing power of the kingdom, as exercised by parliament. Here no
such distinction can be made because no such prerogative exists.
Whatever, therefore, has been or may be done by the governing
power in this commonwealth-the legislature-is more analogous to
acts of parliament establishing ports, or otherwise regulating common and public rights and interests, than to acts of the crown under
its prerogative. This distinction has no other application in this
commonwealth than as it better enables us intelligently to apply the
rules of the common law, and the principles afforded by English
precedents, to cases arising within our own republican government.
The court are, therefore, of opinion that the right to the fisheries, and the power to regulate the use of the fisheries on the coasts
and in the tide waters of the State, are left, in the distribution of
powers between the general and State governments, with the States,
subject only to such powers as Congress may justly exercise in the
regulation of commerce, foreign and domestic. That the exercise of
both of these are not inconsistent, and therefore not in conflict with
each other, was also settled by the Supreme Court of the United
States, in the case of Tilsoii vs. Blackbird Oreek Marsh Co., 2
Pet. 245.
Supposing then that the State in its sovereign capacity has full
dominion and authority over the sea-shores of the State, is it within the legitimate authority and constitutional power of the State
government, when such fisheries are left open for common use, to
make and enforce laws designed to regulate the common use and
enjoyment of the right of fishing, so as to preserve, enlarge and increase the benefit and profit of such fisheries ?
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Upon such a question, which seems sufficiently plain, it may be
well to look once more to those early authorities, to which we have
been accustomed to look with respect for the sources of our civil
and social rights. Yattel, bk. 1, § 246. This venerable writer
says: "In virtue of the same authority [i. e. the dominion and power
which every independent government has over all things within its
territorial limits] the sovereign may make laws to regulate the manner
in which common property is to be used." "Thus, the sovereign
may establish wise laws with respect to hunting and fishing, forbid
them in seasons of propagation, prohibit the use of certain nets, and
of every destructive method, &c." I cite this authority the rather
because it not only clearly announces the general principle, but illustrates it by the specific point in question.
The general rule, that the legislature has power to regulate the
use and enjoyment of public and common rights, is founded on the
plainest principles of fitness, and well established by authority.
And it is for the constituted authorities of the State to determine
what regulations of this character will best promote the public and
common benefit. In the case of Bennett vs. Boggs, Bald. 60, it
was held that a law of Delaware, prohibiting the use of a gilling net
intide waters, within the limits of the State, was valid, and that
the legislature had power to regulate the fisheries in the Delaware
by prohibiting the exercise of a common law right. Indeed the laws
intended to preserve fisheries by protecting fish in reaching their
spawning places and securing them there, are very numerous, both
inEngland and in this country. In a very recent case, Major 'C.,
of Maldon vs. TFoolvet, 12 Ad. & El. 13, Lord Denman, in commenting on a statute of 13 R. 2, c. 19, and declaring the opinion of
the court that it is still in force, says that "the preservation of the
spawn, fry or brood of fish, has been for centuries a favorite subject
of legislation, and the statutes passed for the purpose are extremely
numerous." Certainly, similar acts, made upon similar considerations of expediency, and tending to preserve and secure the common
right, have been frequent here, as well under the colonial and provincial governments as under that of our present constitution. Anc"
Chart. 114, 254.

DUNHAM vs. LAMPHERE.

The statute upon which this action is founded, being apparently
made to prohibit a mode of fishing which might tend to interrupt
the access of the fish to their spawning places, or otherwise tend to
the injury of the fishery by the use of a destructive mode of taking
them, of which the legislature are to judge, the court are of opinion
that it is a constitutional and valid act, and that the defendant
having violated its provisions, is liable for its penalties.
The defendant contends that, by the enrollment of his vessel as a
coasting and fishing vessel, he derives some peculiar privileges, and
insists that he has been licensed to carry on the fisheries in these
waters. It is quite true that his vessel has been enrolled under the
laws of the United States, pursuant to the provisions of the act of
Congress. The effect of this enrollment and license was to give
this vessel all the benefits and privileges of navigating the tide
waters of the State, and such rights to bounty and other privileges
as are given to fishing vessels by the laws of the United States; but
it does not affect the present question.
In recurring to the defendant's answer it will be perceived that he
lays great stress upon the facts, that at the time of the alleged seining he was an inhabitant of another State, that he was master and
part owner of a fishing vessel, enrolled in conformity with the laws
of the United States, and he insists on this ground so earnestly, that
it would seem that he and his legal advisers considered it the main
ground of defence. At first we were led, from this statement of
defence, to suppose that this act, like some others which have been
passed in this commonwealth, contained provisions, prohibiting or
impeding the citizens and inhabitants of other States in the enjoyment of rights and privileges allowed to our own citizens. But upon
recurring to the act, it is clear that there are no discriminating provisions it favor of the citizens of this commonwealth, but that all
the restraints and prohibitions of the statute operate in precisely
the same manner on citizens of the Commonwealth, and those of
other States. We may fairly presume, therefore, that these enactments were all designed to preserve and improve the fishery, for the
benefit of any and all persons entitled to enjoy the advantages of it.
And surely those inhabitants of other States, who come within the
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territorial limits of this State, and thereby owe a temporary allegiance, and become amenable to its laws, have no just reason to
complain, if; when within those limits, and enjoying benefits in common with our own citizens, they are bound to conform to a salutary
law, necessary for the common good. It deprives them of no benefit or privilege which the constitution and laws of the United States
could give, or do profess to give them-that of a free navigation in
and over all the navigable waters of the State.
This answer is satisfactory and quite sufficient to meet and obviate the claims of right, on which this defence is founded. But it
might lead to an implication, that if this act had made a discrimination in favor of the inhabitants and citizens of this commonwealth,
and against citizens of other States, our opinion would have been
otherwise; and as there are many such acts on our statute book, we
have thought it due to the rights of the people of the State, to say
something to avoid this implication.
It has been contended and with some plausibility, that any act of
the State which should give to our own inhabitants a right of fishing
in the sea, within our own territorial limits, and prohibit the same
to the citizens of other States, or allow them to participate in it only
upon the payment of some tax or duty, would be obnoxious to § 2 of
art. 4, of the Constitution of the United States, which declares
"that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States."
We believe that this question has not been directly decided by the
Supreme Court of the United States. It was raised in the Circuit
Court many years ago, before Mr. Justice Washington, who decided, upon grounds which appear plausible, if not satisfactory, that
the right of fishing is in the nature of a right of property, incident
to the right of territory, and that the governing power of the State
has a just right to appropriate it, either by assigning portions to be
held by riparian proprietors, or other individuals or companies in
severalty, or by ordering it to be held to the common and general
use of the inhabitants of the State, as such State should by its laws
determine. He was also of opinion that the privileges and immunities, which the citizens of each State should enjoy in every other,

